1. The problem. The concept of confirmation of an hypothesis by empirical evidence is of fundamental importance in the methodology of empirical science. For, first of all, a sentence cannot even be considered as expressing an empirical hypothesis at all unless it is theoretically capable of confirmation or disconfirmatiOll, Le. unless the kind of evidence can be characterized whose occurrence would confirm, or disconfirm, the sentence in question. J\.nd secondly, the acceptance or rejection of a sentence \vhich does represent an empirical hypothesis is determined, in scientific procedure, by the degree to which it is confirmed by relevant evidence.
The preceding remarks, ho\vevel', are meant only as accounts of methodological tendencies and are not intended to imply the existence of clear-cut criteria ·by means of which the scientist can decide \vhether-or, in quantitative terms, to what degree-a given hypothesis is confirmed by certain data. For indeed, no general and objective criteria of this kind are at present available; in other words, no general definition of the concept of confirmation has been developed 80 far. This is a remarkable fact in vie\v of the importance of the concept concerned, and the question naturally suggests itself \vhether it is at all possible to set up adequate general criteria of confirmation, or \vhether it may not rather be necessary to leave the decision in matters of confirnlation to the intuitive appraisal of the scientist.
This latter alternative \vould be highly unsatisfactory; for firstly, it would clearly jeopardize the objectivity-in the sense of intersubjectivity-of scientific procedure. Secondly, it would run counter to a view of confirmation\vhich is no\v widely accepted; according to this view, statements about confirmation assert nothing regarding an observer's subjective appraisal of the soundness of a hypothesis; rather, they concern a certain objective relation between a hypothesis and the empirical evidence \vith \vhich it is confronted; this relation depends exclusively on the content of the hypothesis and of tIle evidence, and it is of a purely logical character in the sense that once a hypothesis and a description of certain observational findings are given, no further empirical investigation is needed to determine whether, or to \vhat degree, the evidence confirms the hypothesis; the decision is a matter exclusively of certain logical criteria vvhich form the subject matter of a formal discipline which might be called inductive logic.
()f course, the ,videspread acceptance of this vie\v does not prove that it is sound and that the program implicit in it can actually be carried out. The best-and perhaps the only-method of settling the issue seems to consist in actually constructing an explicit and general definition and theory of confirmation. '-ro do this is the purpose of this article. It is intended to present in outline, and ,vith emphasis on the general methodological issues, a theory of 98 confirmation which was developed by the present authors jointly with Dr. Olaf Helmer.! As is illustrated by the terminology used in the preceding discussion, the concept of confirmation may be construed as a metrical (quantitative) as well as a purely classificatory (qualitative) concept. These two different forms are exemplified, respectively, in the phrases "The degree of confirmation of the hypothesis H relatively to the evidence E is such and such," and "The evidence E is confirming (disconfirming, irrelevant) for the hypothesis H." The theory here to be presented deals with the. metrical concept of confirmation; its objective is to construct a definition of the concept of degree of confirmation and to derive, from this definition, a number of consequences, vvhich may be called theorems of inductive logic.
1 A detailed technical exposition of the theory will be given by Olaf Helmer and Paul Oppenheim in a forthcoming article, in vol. 10 of The Journal of Symbolic Logic.
The present issue of Philosophy of Science contains an article by Professor Rudolf Carnap which likewise sets forth a definition and theory of confirmation. The approach to the problem which is to be develqped in the present paper is independent of Professor Carnap's and differs from it in various respects. Some of the points of difference will be exhibited subsequently as the occasion arises. We wish to express our thanks to Professor Carnap for valuable comments he made in the course of an exchange of ideas on the two different studies of confirmation.
We also wish to thank Dr. Kurt Godel for his stimulating remarks. 2 For a definition and theory of the classificatory concept of confirmation, see the following two articles by Carl G. Hempel: A purely syntactical definition of confirmation; The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 8(1943), pp. 122-143 ; Studies in the logic of confirmation; Mind, D.S. vol. 54 (1945) .
The technical term "confirmation" should not be construed in the sense of "verification'-an interpretation which would preclude, for example, its application to a hypothesis about an event which is temporally posterior to the data included in the evidence. Rather, as is suggested by the root "firm," the confirmation of a hypothesis should be u~derstoodas a strengthening of the confidence that can rationally be placed in the hypothesis.
2.4 Some finite number p of one-place predicates, Le. names of properties which anyone of the individuals referred to under 2.3 mayor may not have:
These predicates are undefined concepts in L; we shall therefore refer to them as the primitive predicates of L, and to their designata as the primitive properties referred to in L. 2.5 Individual variables: 'x', 'y', 'z', ... in any number. 2.6 The symbols of universal and existential quantification, as illustrated in '(x)PIx' and '(Ey)P 1 y'. We further assume that these symbols can be combined in the customary ways to form sentences in L 3 , and that the usual rules of deductive inference govern the language L.
Briefly, then, we assume that L has the logical structure of the so-called lower functional calcufus without identity sign, and restricted to property terms only. These assumptions involve a considerable oversimplification from the viewpoint of the practical applicability of the theory here to be presented, for the language of empirical science. includes a great deal of additional logical apparatus, such as relation terms, expressions denoting quantitative magnitudes, etc. However, in appraising the significance pf this restriction, the following points might well be borne in mind: 1. In the case of the concept of degree of confirmation, for which no explicit definition has been available at all, and for which even the theoretical possibility of a definition has been subject to serious doubt, it seems to be a significant achievement if such a definition can be provided, even if its applicability is restricted to languages of a comparatively simple structure. 2. While the means of expression of L are relatively limited, they still go beyond the logical machinery which forms the subject matter of traditional Aristotelian logic. 3. The formulation of a definition for languages of our restricted type may serve as a guide in the construction of an extension of the definition to more complex language forms.
3. Some auxiliary concepts. By an atomic sentence we shall understand any sentence of the kind illustrated by 'PIa', which ascribes a primitive property to some individual. Any sentence such as '(PIa:::> r.....JP 2 a) ·PIb', which contains no quantifiers, "rill be called a molecular sentence.
Let 'Mai' be short for some molecular sentence such as 'Plai 0 (P2ai v r.....JP3ai)', which contains only one individual constant, 'ai'; then we shall say that 'lVI' designates a molecular property-in the example, the property Pl· (P2 v r....
.JP3).
By a statistic we shall understand any sentence of the type +Mai' +Maj' .. , . +Mat where the constants 'ai', 'a/, ... , 'at' are all different from one another, and where the symbol '+' indicates that anyone of the components may be either negated or unnegated. If \ve \vish to indicate specifically the molecular property about whose incidence the statistic reports, \VC shall call a sentence of the above kind an M-statislic.
A sentence \\rhich contains at least one quantifier will be called a general sentence; in particular, all general lu\vs, such as '(x)(P1x :J P2X)', are general sentences.
By means of the p primitive predicates, \ve can form exactly k = 2 p different conjunctions of the follo\ving kind: F~ach conjunction consists of exactly p terms; the first term is either '1\' or '~Pl', the second is either 'P2' or '~P2', and so on; finally, the pth term is either 'Pp' or '~l:>p'. We call these expressions Q-expressions and, in lexicographic order, abbreviate them by 'Ql', 'Q2', ... , 'Qk'. These Q-expressions designate certain molecular properties, which we shall call Q-properlies. Alternatively, \ve may also say that each Q-expression designates a class, namely the class of all those individuals ,vhich have the Q-property in question. '-fhe classes designated by the Q-expressions clearly are mutually exclusive and exhaustive: every object belongs to one and only one of them. Moreover, they arc the narro\vest classes \vhich can be characterized in J../ at all (except for the null ..class, which is designated, for example, by 'PI·~Pl'); for brevity, \ve shall refer to them as (L-)cells. In intuitive terms, we may say that if for a given individual we know to which L-cell it belongs, then we kno\v everything about that individual that can be said in L at all; it is completely determined-relatively to the means of expression of L. 4. A model language and a model world. Our assumptions and definitions for L concern only the logical structure of that language and leave room for considerable variation in material content. For illustrative purposes, it will be useful to be able to refer to a specific model L w of such a language and to a "model world" \V of \vhich it speaks.
I.£t us assume that the individuals aI, a2, as, . .. of which 1../ w speaks are physical objects, and that L w contains just t\VO primitive predicates, 'Blue' and 'Round'. '"fhen L,v determines exactly four cells, Ql = Blue·Round, Q2 = Blue·~Round, Q3 =~Blue·llound, Q4 =~Blue·~Round. All the hypotheses and evidence sentences expressible in 1../ refer exclusively to the characteristics of blueness and roundness of the objects in W. Thus, e.g., the evidence sentence E might report, in the form of a statistic, on a sample of individuals in the following manner: 4.1 E = 'Blue al· Ro~nd al· Blue a2· Round a2·~(Blue a3· Round a3)
. Blue a4·Round a4' and the hypothesis might be 4.2 II = 'Blue a6· Round a6'
In this case, E reports on four objects, three of \vhich \vere found to be blue and round, while one \vas not; and H asserts that a fifth object, not yet examined (Le. not referred to in E), \vill be blue and round. '-fhe question then arises: What degree of confirmation shall be assigned to If on the basis of E? We shall return to this case in the follo\ving section.
5. Restatement of the problem. Our basic problem can now be restated as follows: To define, in purely logical terms, the concept "degree of confirmation of H relatively to E"-or briefly, 'dc(H, E) '-where Hand E are sentences in a language L of the structure characterized in section 2, and where E is not contradictory.
The restriction of E to logically consistent sentences is justifiable on pragmatical grounds: No scientist would consider a contradictory "evidence sentence" as a possible basis for the appraisal of the soundness of an empirical hypothesis. -But the same restriction is demanded also, and more urgently, by considerations of generality and simplicity concerning the formal theory of confirm,ation "rhich is to be based on our definition: We shall try to define de in such a way that the following conditions, among others, are generally satisfied:
But these requirements cannot be generally satisfied unless E is non-contradictory. For if E is a contradictory sentence, then any hypothesis H and its deniall"'..lH are consequences of E, and therefore, by virtue of 5.2, both have the dc 1 with respect to E; hence dc(H, E) + dc(""H, E) = 2, "vhich contradicts 5.1.
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As the illu~tration 4.1 suggests, it might seem natural further to restrict E by the requirement that it has to be a molecular sentence, for in practice, E will usually consist in a report on a 'finite number of observational findings. However, it also happens in science that the evidence adduced in support of a hypothesis (such as Newton's law of gravitation) consists of general laws (such as !(epler's and Galileo's laws), and in the interest of the greatest possible adequacy and comprehensiveness of our definition, we shall therefore allow E to be any non-contradictory sentence in L. 1'he sentence H, which represents the hypothesis under consideration, will be subject to no restrictions whatever; even analytic and contradictory hypotheses will be permitted; in these latter two cases, no matter what the evidence may be, the dc ,vill yield the values 1 or 0, respectively, provided that dc is defined in such a way as to satisfy 5.1 and 5.2.
One of the guiding ideas in our attempt to construct a definition of confirmation will be to evaluate the soundness of a prediction in terms of the relative frequency of similar occurrences in the past. T'his principle appears to be definitely in accordance with scientific procedure, and it provides certain clues for a general definition of dc. Thus, e.g., in the case stated in 4.1 and 4.2, we shall want dc(H, E) to be equal to 3/4. And more generally, we shall want our definition to satisfy the following condition: 5.3 If E is an M-statistic and H a sentence ascribing the property M to an object not mentioned in E, then dc(R, E) is to be the relative frequency of the occurrence of 'M' in E.
account of the inductive procedure of science.
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The applicability of the rule 5.3 is obviously restricted to the case where E is a statistic and H has the special form just described. And since we cannot presuppose that in science Hand E are generally of this very special type, it becomes an important problem to find a rule whose scope will include also more complex forms of H and of E. In fact, this rule will have to be applicable to any H and any consistent E in L, and in cases of the special type just considered, it will have to yield that value of dc which is stipulated in 5.3.-We shall now develop, in a number of steps, the ideas which lead to a definition of the desired kind.
6. Frequency distributions. We have seen that for a given language L, the p primitive predicates determine k = 2 p cells Ql, Q2, ... ,Qk. Each one of these cells may be occupied or empty, i.e. there mayor there may not be individuals having the property which characterizes the elements of that cell. Whether a given cell is empty, and if not, how many objects it contains, is of course an empirical question and not a matter to be settled by logic. At any rate, if the number of all objects is finite, say N, then each cell Qa has a certain occupancy number (i.e., number of elements) N 8, and a certain relative frequency qa = If the cl8B8 of all individuals is infinite-and here we restrict ourselves to the case of a denumerably infinite set of objects-then we shall assume that they are arranged in a fixed sequence, and by qa we shall now generally understand the limit of the relative frequency with which elements belonging to cell Q. occur in that sequence. Now, while we do not actually know the values qs, we may nevertheless consider certain hypothetically assumed values for them and develop the consequences of such an assumption. By a frequency distribution~in L, we shall understand any assignment of non-negative numbers ql" q2, · .. qk to the cells Q1, Qi, ... Qk in such a fashion that 6.1 is satisfied. We shall briefly characterize such a distribution by the following kind of notation:
It follows immediately that in every A,
In the case of L w , one of the infinitely many possible frequency distributions is A = {!,!, 0, !L which represents the case where one half of all objects are blue and round, one third of them blue and not round, none of them round and not blue, and one sixth of them neither blue nor round. 8 Note that distributions cannot be characterized in L and that, therefore, they cannot form the content of any hypothesis that may be formulated in L; we speak about them in a suitable meta-language for L. In our case, this meta-language is English, supplemented by a number of symbols, such as 'H', 'E', 'Ql', 'Q2', ••• ,'A\ etc. It might be well to emphasize at this point that the definition and the entire theory of dc for L is formulated in that 7. Probability of a hypothesis. If a fixed frequency distribution~is given or hypothetically assumed for the cells determined by L, then it is possible to define a concept 'pr(H, E, Ll) '-in vvords: "the probability of H relatively to E according to the distribution~,"-vvhich we shall then use to define dc(H, E).
The meaning of this probability concept will first be explained by reference to our model. Let us consider the process of establishing evidence sentences, and of testing hypotheses by means of them, in analogy to that of drawing samples from an urn and using the evidence thus obtained for the test of certain hypotheses. The latter may concern either the distribution of certain characteristics over the whole population of the urn, or the occurrence or nonoccurrence of certain characteristics in objects subsequently to be drawn from the urn. For the sake of simplicity we shall assume from now on that the totality of all objects to \vhich L refers is denumerably infinite. (This does not necessarily mean that L contains infinitely many individual constants, but it does mean that the universal and existential quantifiers occurring in the general sentences of L refer to an infinite domain.)-Now let us imagine that for our model \vorld W we are given the frequencies associated with the four cells determined by the two predicates of L w ; let this distribution be L\l = {!, 1, 0, !}.
Suppose further that the hypothesis HI = 'Blue al· Round aI' is under consideration. We wish to sho\v that a definite probability pr(H 1 , E,~I) can be assigned to HI with respect to any given E (with a restriction to be mentioned subsequently), according to the frequency distribution L\I.
I. We first consider the case where no information besides~l is available; in this case, E may be taken to be some analytic sentence, say 'Blue at v ""Blue aI', which \ve shall designate by 'T'. Thus, we are concerned with an explanation of pr(H I , T, Ll I ), Le. the probability of H l according to the frequency distribution Ll l . We shall construe the problem of defining this magnitude in strict analogy to the follo\ving question: Given the distribution Ll l for the population of an urn \V, \vhat is the probability that the first object drawn will be both blue and round? And since there is no discrimination among the objects except in terms of their properties referred to in L w , this latter probability will be the same as the probability that some object, chosen at random from the urn, will be both blue and round. The latter probability, ho\vever, is uniquely determined by the given distribution: it is the relative frequency assigned to Ql in~l. In our case, therefore, pr(Hl, T, Ll l ) == t. No\v let H 2 == 'Blue al', which is logically equivalent with '(Blue al' Round al)v(Blue al' I"' VRound al)'. This sentence asserts that aibelongs to one of two cells \vhose occupancy frequencies, according to Lll, are t and 1, respectively. And since the cells are mutually exclusive, \ve set pr(H2, T, Lll) == t + l. Similarly, for H 3 == 'I"'VBlue a2', pr(H3, T,~l) = 1.
Finally, let H4 == 'Blue al·Blue a2·I"'VBlue a3'; then \ve set pr(H4, T, L\l) == .-g-.1. 9 meta-language, not in L itself: In the meta-language, we speak about the sentences of L and about the degrees to \vhich certain sentences confirm others. 9 In the case of a finite total population, the application of the simple product rule presupposes that the objects constituting a sample are taken from the urn one at a time, and that each of them is replaced into the urn before the next one is drawn. In order to avoid complications of this sort, we assume the population to be infinite.
After these illustrations, we shall no\v outline a general method of determining pr(H, T, d) for any given Hand d. For this purpose, ,ve introduce an auxiliary concept. By a perfect description, ,ve shall understand a conjunction each of whose terms assigns some particular individual to some definite L-cell, and in which no individual is mentioned more than once. Thus, e.g., 'Qlal· Qla2· Q2a4· Q4a6' is a perfect description.
IA. Now consider first the case that H is a molecular sentence. Then H can always be transformed into a conjunction of perfect descriptions. 'Ve omit the elementary but somewhat lengthy proof of this theorem here and rather illustrate it by an example: Let L contain exactly t,vo primitive predicates, 'PI' and 'P2', and let H s == 'PIal· P2a2'; then Hs can readily be expanded into the following expression:
which in turn is equivalent to '(QlalvQ2al)· (Qla2vQ3a2)'; and this can be transformed into the following disjunction of perfect descriptions:
Once H has thus been transformed, the determination of pr(H,T, d) follows simply the following two rules, which were illustrated above: (a) The probability of H with respect to T and d is the sum of the probabilities of the perfect descriptions whose disjunction is equivalent to H; (b) The probability of a perfect description with respect to T and d is the product of the relative frequencies assigned by d to the Q-expressions occurring in the perfect description. Thus, if d = {ql' q2, q3, q4}, then pr(Hs, T, d) == q2 + qlq3 + q2ql + q2q3.
lB. If H is a general sentence, then two cases have to be distinguished t : a) If the number N of all objects to ,vhich L refers is finite, then H can obviously be transformed into a molecular sentence. Thus, e.g., the hypothesis '(x) (PIX :J P2X)· (Ey)P 3 y' is equivalent to the following molecular sentence, which will also be called the b) If the class of all individuals is denumerably infinite and ordered in a sequence at, a2, as, ... -and this is the case ,vith ,vhich we are principally concerned-then we define pr(H, T, d) as the limit, for indefinitely increasing N, of pr(DN(H), T, d). It can be shown that this limit exists in all cases. (In particular, we note that when H is a general sentence containing no individual constants the limit in question is either 0 or 1).
II. We no,v turn to the concept 'pr(H, E, d)', ,vhich refers to those cases where, besides the distribution d, some additional information E is given. To illustrate this case by means of the urn analogue and by reference to L w : Let again dl = {!, 1,0, -!L and let H 6 = 'rovRound as'. Then pr(H6, T, dl) = 1 + l =!. Now suppose that we are given the additional information E I = 'Blue a5'. In the light of the thus enlarged total information, H 6 will acquire a different probability: Since, according to E 1 , a5 is blue, and since, according to AI, the frequency of the non-round objects among the blue ones is i -;-(! + !) = -8-, we shall set pr(H 6 , E 1, AI) = f.
A completely generaly definition of pr(H, E, A) can be given in terms of the narrower concept 'pr(H, T, A)': 7.1 pr(H, E, A) = pr(H·E, T·A)
pr(E, T, A)
This definition presupposes that pr(E, T, A)~0; when this condition is not satisfied, pr(H, E, A) will not be defined.
This definition is suggested by the following consideration: We wish pr(H, E, A), for any fixed A, to satisfy the standard principles of probability theory·1o, including the general multiplication principle. Now the latter demands that pr(E·H, T, A) = pr(E, T, A) ·pr(H, E·T, A)
In view of the fact that E·H is logically equivalent to H·E and E·T logically equivalent to E, this leads to 7.1.
It can be proved that the concept thus defined satisfies all the customary postulates of probability theory.ll 8. Optimum distributions relatively to given evidence. Our problem of defining dc(H, E) could now readily be solved if it were generally possible to infer from the given evidence E the frequency distribution A characteristic of the L-cells in the language under consideration; for ,ve could then simply identify dc(H, E) with pr(H, E, A). Unfortunately, however, no evidence sentence that is expressible in L can be strong enough to permit such an inference. Nonetheless, a closely related but somewhat weaker procedure is indeed available for the definition of dc(H, E). This procedure is based on the fact that while a given E does not uniquely determine a fixed A, it may confer different degrees of likelihood-in a sense presently to be explained-upon the different possible distributions. Under favorable circumstances it may even be possible to characterize one particular distribution; A E , as the one which is most likely on the basis of E; and in this case, dc(H, E) might be defined as pr(H, E, A E ) • We shall eventually extend this idea to the case where E does not uniquely determine just one most likely distribution; but before going into the details of this method, which will be done in the subsequent section, \ve have first to clarify the idea of likelihood referred to in the preceding discussion.
Let us illustrate the essential points by reference to L w and the urn analogue. Suppose that E 1 is a report asserting that among 12 objects selected at random, 6 were blue and round, 4 blue and not round, and 2 neither blue nor round. If no additional information is available, we \vould say that in the light of the given evidence, Al = {!, -1, 0, !} is more likely than, say, A2 = {t, i, 0, -J}, and that the latter is more likely than, say,~3 = {-to, -to, 1'0' Io}. Precisely how is the meaning of "more likely" to be construed here? It was shown in the preceding section that on the basis of any given frequency distribution~, and in the absence of any further information, it is possible to assign to every sentence S of L a definite probability preS, T,~); here, S may be a hypothesis under test or any other sentence in L. In particular, we may consider the case where S is our given evidence sentence E; Le., we may ask: What is the probability pr(E, T,~) which E would possess on the basis of a certain hypothetical distribution~, and in the absence of any other information? If E is made more probable, in this sense, by a certain distribution~l than by another distribution~2, then we shall say that~I has a greater likelihood relatively to E than does~2. Relatively to some given evidence E, therefore, the infinitely many theoretically possible frequency distributions fall into a definite order of likelihood. By an optimum distribution relatively to E, we shall understand a distributions uch that the probability pr(E, T,~) which~confers upon E is not exceeded by the probability that any other distribution would assign to E.I~Now it cannot be expected that every possible E determines exactly one optimum distribution: there may be several distributions each of which would give to E the same, maximum, probability. Thus, e.g.-to mention just one simple casethe probability of the evidence sentence 'Blue aI' in L w will clearly be maximized by any distribution which makes the frequency of the blue objects equal to 1, Le. by any distribution of the form {ql, 1 -ql, 0, O}, where ql may have any arbitrary value between 0 and 1 inclusive. It can be shown, however, that every E determines at least one optimum distribution; if there are several of them, then, of course, they all will confer the same probability upon E. We shall use the symbol '~E' to refer to the optimum distribution or distributions relatively to E;~E is, therefore, a generally plurivalued function of the evidence E.
12 An alternative to this approach would be to determine, by means of Bayes' theorem, that distribution upon which E confers the greatest probability (in contradistinction to our question for that distribution which confers upon E the maximum probability); but this approach presupposes-to state it first by reference to the urn analogue-an infinity of urns, each with a different frequency distribution; and to each urn U, there would have to be assigned a definite a priori probability for the sample to be taken from U. Applied to our problem, this method would involve reference to an infinity of possible states of the world, to each of which there would have to be attached a certain a priori probability of being realized; and for such a "lottery of states of the world,'~as it were, it seems very difficult to find an empiricist interpretation.
The determination of~E for given I~is a mathematical problem whosetreatr ment \vill be discussed here only in outline. Consider again the model language L w and the four cells Ql, Q2, Q3, Q4 determined by it. I.£t a specific evidence sentence ]~be given. 1'0 find~E, consider the general case of a hypothetical distribution~= {ql' q2, q3, q4}, \vhere the four components of~are parameters satisfying the conditions 8.1 8.2 (s = 1, 2, 3, 4)
The probability pr(E, T,~) \vhich~confers upon l~\vill be a function f(ql, q2, q3, q4) of the parameters, as is illustrated at the end of IA in section 6.
E can now be found by determining those values of the parameters \vhich satisfy 8.1 and 8.2, and for \vhich f(ql' q2, q3, q4) assumes an absolute maximum. These values are found by partial differentiation of the function f. By equating the partial derivatives to 0, a system of simultaneous equations is obtained whose solution (or solutions) yield the value (or values) of~E for the given evidence E. Explicit formulae for the solution of such systems of equations \vill be available only in special cases; but in many other cases, methods of computation can be indicated which will at least approximate the solutions. We mention here only one result of particular importance: 8.3 If E is a perfect description-as, for example, 'Qlal· Qla2· Qla3· Q2a4· Q2a6·
Q3a6' in Lv-then~E is unique, and its components are simply the relative frequencies with \vhich the cells are represented in E-in our example,
The method which has been used here to characterize optimum distributions goes back to a procedure introduced by R. A. Fisher as the maximum likelihood method.
L3
We shall consider later the general character of our procedure, but first \ve turn to the definition of dc in terms of the concept of optimum distribution.
Definition of dc(H, E).
In accordance with the program outlined in the beginning of the preceding section, \ve now define
dc(H, E) = pr(H, E,~E)
This definition embodies an empiricist reconstruction of the concept of degree of confirmation: On the basis of the given evidence E, we infer the optimum distribution (or distributions)~E and then assign to II, as its degree of confirmation, the probability \vhich H possesses relatively to l~according to~E.
As can be seen from 7.1, the definition 9.1 determines dc(H, E) in all cases where pr(E, T,~E)~o. No\v it can be sho\vn that this condition is satisfied if and only if E is logically consistent; so that, by 9.1, dc(H, E) is defined for every non-contradictory E.
It should be noted, however, that, since~E is not necessarily single-valued, dc(H, E) may have more than one value. 14 Thus, e.g., when H = 'PIa' and E = 'P 2 b', dc(H, E) turns out to have as its values all the real numbers between oand 1 inclusive. This is quite sensible in view of the fact that the given E is entirely irrelevant for the assertion made by H; E, therefore, can impose no restrictions at all upon the range of the logically possible values of the degree to which H may be confirmed.
However, dc(H, E) can be shown to be single-valued in large classes of cases; these include, in particular, the cases where E is a perfect description, as can readily be seen from theorem 8.3. Also, it can be shown that in all cases of the kind characterized in 5.3, our definition leads to a unique value of dc(H, E), and that this value is the relative frequency stipulated in 5.3.
We shall now analyze in some detall a special example which incidentally shows that de can be single-valued in cases other than those ju~t mentioned. Let L contain just one primitive predicate, 'P,' and let and In order to determine AE' we have to find that d = {q,l -q} which maximizes the magni- 2V3 3 -va = --.
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14 The symbol 'dc(H, E)' is therefore used here in a similar manner as, say, 'Vx' in mathematics; both represent functions which are not generally single-valued. An alterna-.-; tive would be to stipulate that de(H, E) is to equal pr(H, E, A E ) in those cases where the latter function is single-valued, and that in all other cases, dc(H, E) is to remain undefined. A third possibility would be to define dc(H, E) as the smallest value of pr(H, E, A E ); for of two hypotheses tested by means of the same evidence, that one will be considered more reliable for which that smallest value is greater. This definition, however, has a certain disadvantage, which is explained in footnote 17. After having considered some examples involving non-general hypotheses, we now turn to the~ase of hypotheses in the form of general sentences. Let us assume, for example, that L contains again only one primitive predicate, 'P', and letH~'(x)Px', E1 == 'Pal'" E 2 = 'Pal·Pa2· ... Pat', Ea z:: '"",Pal·Pa2·Paa• ••• Pat'. To compute the values of de for these cases, we note first that, as can readily be shown, conditions 5.1 and 5.2 are satisfied by de as defined in 9.1, and that, as a consequence, dc(R, E) = 0 whenever H contradicts E. Now, if again we assume the class of all objects to be infinite, we
no matter now large t may be. The last value appears perfectly reasonable: Since E.
contains one conjunctive term which contradicts H, E s itself contradicts H and thus disconfirms it to the highest degree that is theoretically possible. The value 1 in the first two cases, however, might seem counter-intuitive for two reasons: First, it seems strange that it should make no difference for the value of de (H, E) how many confirming instances for H are included in E-as long as E contains no disconfirming evidence; and second, it is surprising that even one single confirming case for H should confirm the hypothesis H-which virtually covers an'infinity of such cases-to the maximum extent. The significance of these results might become clearer if we distinguish between the retrospective and the prospective aspects of what has sometimes been called the probability, and what we call the degree of confirmation, of a universal hypothesis. Taken retrospectively, the magnitude in question is to characterize the extent to which H is confirmed "by past experience," i.e. by the given evidence E; taken prospectively, it is to constitute, as it were, a measure of the warranted assertability of the hypothesis, or of the rational belief to be placed in its validity in instances which have as yet not been examined. Now clearly, in our illustration) H is confirmed to the fullest possible extent by E 1 as well as by E 2 : in both cases itis satisfied in 100 per cent of the instances mentioned by E. As'to the prospective aspect, it is simply an inductivist attitude which directs us to assign the de IN to the hypothesis that the next N instances will conform to the hypothesis, and finally, the limit of IN, for indefinitely increasing N, to the hypothesis itself, Le. to the assumption that all objects conform to it.
10. Probability and degree of confirmation. Might dc(R, E) as well be called the probability of the hypothesis H relatively to the evidence E? Partly, of course, that is a matter of arbitrary terminological decision. However, the concept of probability has come to be used with reference to magnitudes which satisfy certain conditions which, for brevity, will be 'called here the postulates of general probability theory.16 We shall summarize them here in a form adapted from Janina Hosiasson-Lindenbaum's article "On confirmation.,,16
The probability of H relatively to E, or, briefly, p(H, E) is a single-valued function of two sentences, the second of which is non-contradictory. This function satisfies the follo\ving conditions: 10.1 If H is a consequence of E, then p(H, E) = 1 10.2 If E implies that HI and H 2 cannot both be true, then p(Hl v H 2 , E) = p(H 1 , E) + p(H 2 , E) (Special addition principle of probability theory) 10.3 (General multiplication principle of probability theory) 10.4 If E 1 and E 2 are logically equivalent, then The concept 'pr(H, E,~)' can be shown to satisfy, for any fixed .1, all of these conditions. But the concept 'dc(H, E)', which is defined by reference to it, does not. For, firstly, as we saw, dc(H, E) is not always a single-valued function of Hand E. As to the four postulates listed above, the following can be shown: The first, second, and fourth postulates are generally satisfied by dc provided 'that when dc is plurivalued, "corresponding values"-Le. values obtained from the same~E-are substituted in the formulae. The third postulate, however, is not generally satisfied; the reason for this becomes clear when in 10.3, 'dc' is replaced by its definiens. Then the left hand side turns into 'pr(H I · H 2 , E, dE)" and as 'pr' satisfies the general multiplication principle, we may transform the last expression into 'pr(H1, E,~E)· pr(H2, HI· E,~E)'; but the right hand side of 10.3 transforms into 'pr(H I , E, dE) ·pr(H2, HI·E, dHl,E)'; and clearly, the second factors in these two expressions cannot generally be expected to be equal. However, the following restricted version of 10.3 is generally satisfied: 10.3' "Corresponding values" of dc(H, E) satisfy 10.3 in particular if the two following conditions are satisfied: (a) HI and H 2 have no individual constants in common, (b) At least one of the hypotheses HI, H 2 has no individual constants in common with E.
17
15 On this point, cf. also section 3 of Professor Carnap's article. 16 The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 5 (1940), pp. 133-148. 17 In footnote 14, two alternatives to our definition of dc were mentioned. It can be shown that the concept determined by the first of these satisfies without exception the requirements 10.1, 10.2, 10.3', and 10.4, whereas the concept introduced by the second alternative does not. Thus, e.g., if H = 'Pial', E = 'P2a2', then the values of pr (H, E, Am) are all the real numbers from 0 to 1 inclusive, so that the smallest value is O. The same is true of pr("-'H, E, Am); hence these two smallest values violate the principle 5.1 and thus indirectly the postulates 10.1 and 10.2, of which 5.1 can be shown to be a consequence.
In view of the fact that dc as defined above does not satisfy all of the postulates of probabilitytheory, \ve prefer not to call dc a probability.17a
Finally, it may be ofinterest to compare our \vay of defining dc with another method, which makes use of the concept of measure ofa sentence. Briefly, this method consists in assigning, by means of some general rule, a measure m (8) The degree of confirmation of a hypothesis H with respect to a non-contradictory evidence sentence E is then defined as m~~E~)' The stipulations 10.5 leave room for an infinite variety of possible measure functions; the choice of a particular function will be determined by the adequacy of the concept of degree of confirmation which is definable in terms of it.
18
Our concept 'dc(H, E)' can be introduced in a formally similar manner as follo\vs: Instead of assigning to each sentence of L once and for all an apriori measure, as it is done in the method just described, we give to the sentences of L measures \vhich depend on the given empirical evidence E. The E-measure of a sentence 8 in L can be defined thus:
10.6
In terms of this magnitude, \ve can express dc(H, E) as follows: 10.7 dc (H,E) for by virtue of 9.1, 7.1, and 10.6,
171' The alternative term "likelihood" which suggests itself is inexpedient also, as it has already been introduced into theoretical statistics with a different meaning (cf. section 8 above). If a term customarily associated \vith "probability" should be desired, then "expectancy" might be taken into consideration.
18 The method characterized above is illustrated by a definition of probability which F. Waismann (Logische Analyse des Wahrscheinlichkeitsbegriffs, Erkenntnis, vol. 1, pp. 228-248) has outlined follovving a suggestion made in L.Wittgenstein's Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus (New York and London 1922) . Also, the regular c-functions introduced in Professor Carnap's article on inductive logic exemplify this way of defining de. In that article, some special choices for the measure function m are presented~nd examined as to their suitability for the establishment of an adequate definition of the concept of degree of confirmation.
(As was pointed out in connection ,vith 9.1, mE(E) = pr(E, T,~E) equals 0 only when E is contradictory; in this case, dc(H, E) is not defined.)
11. Concluding remarks. The concept of dc as it has been defined here is a purely logical concept in the following sense: Given two sentences H, E in L, dc(H, E) is completely determined by the formal, or syntactical, structure of the two sentences alone, and apart from possible mathematical complications, its value can be found by an analysis of that structure and the application of certain purely deductive mathematical techniques. Nevertheless, the proposed concept is empiricist and not "aprioristic" in character; for the degree of confirmation assigned to H is determined, generally speaking, by reference to relative frequencies derived from the evidence sentence E. With reference to the alternative definition 10.6, the matter can be stated as follows: dc is defined in terms of the concept of measure of a sentence; but whereas in an aprioristic theory, the measure of a sentence is determined once and for all on the basis of a mere analysis of its logical structure, the measure used in 10.6 is empiricist in that its <leterminati<?n requires reference not only to the structure of the sentence, but also to the given empirical evidence E.
The method employed to determine dc(H, E) consists essentially of two steps: First, by means of the maximum likelihood principle, a hypothetical assumption is formed, on the basis of E, as to the frequency distribution for the L-cells; second, on the basis of the hypothetical distribution thus assumed, a probability is assigned to H relatively to E. The rationale of this procedure is perhaps best exhibited by reference to a simple model case. Suppose that we are given a die about ,vhose homogeneity and symmetry nothing is known. We have an opportunity to roll the die 20 times and are then to lay a bet on the hypothesis H that both the 21st and the 22nd throw will yield a six. The maximum likelihood principle would direct us, in this particularly simple case, to record, in a report E, the occurrence or non-occurrence of a six as the result of each of the first t\venty thro,vs, and then to form a hypothesis as to the limit of the relative frequency \vith which throws with the given die will yield a six. This limit is to be chosen in such a way that relatively to it, the distribution of the results found in E has a maximum probability. In the simple case under consideration, this means that we have to set the limit equal to the relative frequency with which the result six is reported in E; let this be lo; then the distribution~E = {lo, -fo} for the cells corresponding to the results six and non-six is the optimum distribution, and on the basis of it, dc(H, E) becomes 1~0 ; this value would be the basis for determining the rates of a fair bet on H, in the light of E.
In this special case, which is covered by the rule 5.3, the procedure dictated by the maximum likelihood principle clearly coincides with that which a "rational gambler" would use, and which is also used in statistical investigations . of various kinds. It reflects an assumption which might be called the statistical version of the principle of induction, and which, stated in very crude terms, implies that relative frequencies observed "in the past" (i.e. in the instances so far examined) will remain fairly stable "in the future" (i.e. in those instances which have not as yet been examined, no matter whether they belong to the past or to the future). The maximum likelihood principle in the form in~hich it has been used here for the general definition of dc is but an extension of this same idea to cases more complex than those covered by rule 5.3; and we may say that it represents a generalization and rational reconstruction of the statistical version of the principle of induction. The theory obtained by our procedure provides criteria which establish, so to speak, a fair rate of betting on a specified hypothesis on the basis of given data. (In many cases, as we saw, dc will be single-valued and the betting rate will therefore be uniquely determined; in other cases, where the evidence is insufficient in a certain sense, dc will have several values, and then, the smallest of these might be used to establish a betting rate.) The decisions, however, which a gambler has to make concern not only the betting rate but also the amount he is going to risk; and while the rate is determined, generally speaking, by the relative frequency in the past of the event on which he wishes to bet, the gambler's stake will be determined by different factors, such as, e.g., the size of the sample which represents the evidence. Analogously, the concept of degree of confirmation as it has been defined in the present article, refers only to one among several factors which enter into an objective appraisal of the soundness or reliability of an empirical hypothesis. The remaining factors include, among others, the number of tested instances which are mentioned in E, and the variety of those instances.
1iJ
Our theory of confirmation is intended to account exclusively for the first of these various aspects of the evaluation of a hypothesis by means of relevant evidence,-that aspect which is analogous to the betting rate in the preceding example.
The theory of confirmation which has been outlined in this article cannot claim to be more than a first contribution to the exploration of a field in which systematic logical research is only beginning. Among various problems which are suggested by the present study, we should like to point out a few which seem to deserve special attention in future research:
(1) The next step in the development of the theory of confirmation would be the extension of the definition of dc to the entire lower functional calculus and possibly even to the higher functional calculus.
(2) In section 1, we distinguished the metrical concept of degree of confirmation from the classificatory concepts of confirming and disconfirming evidence for a given hypothesis. In this connection, the question arises whether the meaning of the expressions "E is confirming evidence for H" and "E is disconfirming evidence for H" is adequately definable in terms of dc(H, E).
(3) In the practice of scientific research, observation reports are not all considered equally reliable; rather, their reliability will depend on certain characteristics of the observer, on . . the instruments of observation used, and on the circumstances under which the observation took place. Also, when· general sentences are included in the evidence E.) these might be said to have different degrees of reliability (which, for example, might be determined on the basis of their dc relatively to all the relevant evidence known at the time). We might try to reflect this aspect of scientific testing by assuming in our theory that each evidence sentence is assigned a numerical "weight," whose value is a real number between 0 and 1, inclusive. The problem then arises of defining dc(R, E) in a manner. which takes into consideration those weights attached to the evidence. The generalized definition here called for should comprehend, as one special case, our definition 9.1 (or another adequate definition of this kind); for the latter rests, as it were, on the tacit assumption that the weight of the given evidence is always 1.
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